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Equal Access to Air Transportation-
The Only Way To Fly
David B.B. Helfrey*
and Russell W. Piraino**
Introduction
On August 8, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit handed down its opinion in the case of Tallarico v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. I The opinion held that private individ-
uals could sue air carriers for discriminatory treatment under the
provisions of the Air Carrier Access Act.2 The decision was a ma-
jor development in this evolving area of federal antidiscrimination
law. This article will examine the Tallarico opinion, its impor-
tance to all persons concerned with antidiscrimination legislation,
and the unanswered questions still facing those who seek to en-
sure equal access to air transportation regardless of physical
handicap.3
I. Background of the Air Carrier Access Act
A thorough understanding of the impact of the Tallarico de-
cision requires a general knowledge of the legislative background
of the Air Carrier Access Act. Seventeen years ago, Congress
* Mr. Helfrey is a partner in the St. Louis law firm of Guilfoil, Petzall and
Shoemake, and is a former head of the Kansas City Organized Crime Strike Force.
He is a 1968 graduate of Northwestern University School of Law, and represented
Polly Tallarico in the trial court, and in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.
** Mr. Piraino is a 1987 graduate of Washington University School of Law in
St. Louis, Missouri. Mr. Piraino was formally an associate with Guilfoil, Petzall and
Shoemake in St. Louis, and is currently in-house counsel for Mallinckrodt Specialty
Chemicals Company.
1. Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989) [herein-
after Tallarico II].
2. Id. at 570 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter
ACAAJ).
3. Although the authors are aware that the term "handicap" is objectionable
to many physically challenged persons, the statutory language is used for the sake
of clarity.
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passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.4 For millions of physically
and mentally challenged Americans, this statute provided hope
that the federal courts would finally provide a viable avenue of re-
lief from discrimination against the disabled in housing, education,
transportation, and a variety of other needs and activities that
most United States citizens take for granted.5 The Act's useful-
ness as a tool against discrimination, however, is severely limited
by the fact that the only organizations subject to its provisions are
those which receive federal subsidies. That limitation has a serious
impact on the effectiveness of the antidiscrimination provision in
the area of equal access to air transportation.6
The problem was illustrated in 1986 when the United States
Supreme Court decided the case of United States Department of
4. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-796i
(1988)). The statute provides that:
[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794.
5. Congress has noted that some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physi-
cal or mental disabilities, and that:
individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of dis-
crimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discrimina-
tory effects of architectural, transportation and communication
barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifica-
tions to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualificiation
standards and criteria, segregation and relegation to lesser services,
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities ....
Americans With Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-339, § 2, - Stat. - (1990).
In response to this situation, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the
Americans With Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, - Stat. - (1990). This Act
prohibits discrimination based on handicap in the areas of employment (Title II),
public services (Title III), public accommodations and public transportation pro-
vided by private entities (Title IV) (excluding air transportation, § 303(a)). A de-
tailed discussion of this bill or the numerous issues the disabled face in areas other
than air transportation would exceed the scope of this article.
6. The horror stories recounted by handicapped air passengers are numerous.
Reports of seriously damaged wheelchairs and other equipment, indifferent or even
hostile treatment by airline "service" personnel, and general ignorance on the part
of the airline industry regarding the actual needs and abilities of the physically
challenged are commonplace. See generally Michael Ervin, Unfriendly Skies, The
Progressive, June 1989, at 28 (focusing primarily on the stereotypes and attitudes
which constitute barriers to equal access to air transportation for the handicapped).
For a detailed discussion of the physical barriers encountered by the handicapped
in air transportation, see Katherine Hunter & Robert Layton, Barriers and Safety
Risks for Elderly and Handicapped Travelers at Airports, reprinted in Transporta-
tion Research Board, National Research Council, Issues in Providing Mobility for
the Transportation Handicapped (1986).
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Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America.7 In Paralyzed
Veterans, the Court held that the Rehabilitation Act applied only
to air carriers which received direct federal subsidies, thus exclud-
ing from its coverage most major airlines and the vast majority of
commercial air passengers. 8 The consensus was that "the practical
effect of Paralyzed Veterans was to leave handicapped air travel-
ers subject to the possibility of discriminatory, inconsistent and un-
predictable treatment on the part of air carriers."9
Congress acted quickly to redress the situation Paralyzed Vet-
erans created. Later that same year, Congress passed the Air Car-
rier Access Act which provides that "[n]o air carrier may
discriminate against any otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air transporta-
tion."'10 The passage of the Act applied the standard of equal
access to the airline industry as a whole. However, the effective-
ness of the new statute was soon tested.
II. The Facts of Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
On November 25, 1986, Polly Tallarico, a thirteen-year-old
student, arrived at Houston's Hobby Airport for a Thanksgiving
trip to St. Louis to visit her parents. Polly has cerebral palsy. She
is able to communicate through sign language, by use of a commu-
nication board, a memo writer, and a Minispeak."1 Although Polly
normally uses a wheelchair, she is able to move around unas-
sisted.' 2 Polly has normal intelligence and is able to understand
verbal and written instructions. Polly is able to fasten and unfas-
ten a seatbelt and use an oxygen mask without assistance.' 3 Fur-
thermore, before November 1986 Polly had flown unaccompanied
on at least one commercial flight without incident.'4
All of the foregoing personal information about Polly had
been given to a travel agent when Polly's parents made the reser-
vations for her flight home on Trans World Airlines.15 The travel
7. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
8. Id. at 605-06.
9. S. Rep. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2328, 2329.
10. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
11. See 881 F.2d at 569. The communication board is a tray-like device that at-
taches to Polly's wheelchair upon which is contained the alphabet, words, numbers
and symbols to which she can point. Id. The memo writer is a small, typewriter-
like device with a liquid crystal display and paper printer. Id. The Minispeak is a
small computer device that vocalizes words that are typed into it. Id.
12. Id.; Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 7-8; Vol. 2 at 135-36.
13. Tallarico II at 569; Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 48; Vol. 2 at 136.
14. Tallarico II at 569; Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 48.
15. Trial Transcript Vol. 2 at 31-32.
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agent, in turn, conveyed this information to a TWA ticket agent
more than thirty days before the plane's departure.'6 The travel
agent also filed a TWA "special service request" with the airline.
TWA's computer confirmed this special service request well before
the date of the flight.'7 Having complied with all of TWA's policies
and procedures, neither Polly Tallarico nor her parents had reason
to expect any trouble when Polly arrived at the airport, accompa-
nied only by a driver whom she had met that day. Upon arriving
at the TWA service counter, however, the ticket agent informed
Polly's driver that the girl would not be allowed to board the air-
plane.'8 The preliminary decision not to allow Polly to board ap-
parently reflected the ticket agent's unilateral decision that Polly
was unable to attend to her needs or follow the instructions of the
flight crew. This decision, later confirmed by the acting station
chief,19 was made without ever attempting to discuss the situation
with Polly herself.20 The only communication any TWA personnel
made was to Polly's driver, who, as mentioned, had met Polly only
that day.
After the airline refused to allow her to board, Polly was
forced to wait in the Houston airport for over ten hours, accompa-
nied only by her driver. She had almost nothing to eat and no
money.2 ' No TWA personnel made any offer to assist Polly during
this time, despite TWA's assurance to Polly's parents in St. Louis
that TWA was caring for their daughter. 22 Polly's father flew from
St. Louis to Houston and accompanied Polly home the next day,
on a different airline.23 Their flight home was without incident.24
Although Polly Tallarico's treatment by the airline was by no
means unique,25 the recently enacted Air Carrier Access Act gave
Polly and her family a way to challenge the discrimination in
court. However, the Tallaricos faced two major legal obstacles in
16. Id,
17. Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 214.
18. Tallarico II at 568; Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 121-22, 126, 130, 151.
19. Trial Transcript Vol. 2 at 100; Vol. 3 at 35, 124, 190.
20. Trial Transcript Vol. 3 at 184.
21. Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 160.
22. Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 166-67.
23. Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, 693 F. Supp. 785, 787 (E.D. Mo. 1988)
[hereinafter Tallarico 1].
24. Trial Transcript Vol. 1 at 65-67.
25. Disabled air travelers who are not expressly denied the right to board an
aircraft nonetheless encounter substantial physical and attitudinal barriers before
the flight ever leaves the ground. See Hunter & Layton, supra note 6, for a discus-
sion of the various physical barriers in the airport terminal itself, including acces-
sability problems related to parking, portals, foyers, passenger check-in, airport
services, and gate access.
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their pursuit of a judicial remedy. First, Congress had not specifi-
cally authorized suits by private individuals against air carriers for
violations of the Act. Second, the Tallarico's damages, if measured
in purely monetary terms, were too small to warrant a costly legal
battle. If measured in terms of emotional damage and damage to
Polly's confidence and self-esteem, however, the Tallaricos simply
could not afford to ignore the incident.
III. The Trial
The Tallaricos filed suit against TWA in federal court in St.
Louis, Missouri, claiming that the Air Carrier Access Act author-
ized individual suits against airlines.26 The jury returned a verdict
in favor of Polly and her parents in the amount of $92,000,27 but
their victory was short-lived. The trial judge ruled that, although
the Act did confer the right to sue upon individual plaintiffs, the
jury's award of $80,000 was excessive. 28 The court characterized
the bulk of the award as damages "for emotional distress." 29  The
court then concluded that such damages were not recoverable
under the Act and, therefore, reduced the award to $1,350, an
amount equal to the Tallarico's actual, out-of-pocket expenses.3 0
That ruling severely impaired the efficacy of the newly en-
acted Act as a means of redress for discriminatory practices. The
jury found that the airline had engaged in discrimination. The
court's ruling, if left unchallenged, would set a precedent which
would allow private individuals to sue for discrimination, but
would severely limit the amount of recoverable damages. Since, in
many cases, the actual monetary loss victims of discrimination suf-
fer is insufficient to warrant the high cost of lengthy litigation, the
trial court's ruling would have left a large number of these victims
with no effective recourse.
The Tallaricos appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit. TWA also appealed, contending that
the trial court had erred in deciding that private suits were author-
ized under the Act. Both the issue of whether a private cause of
action existed and whether damages were available for emotional
26. The Tallaricos also asserted several state causes of action, including breach
of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Tallarico I at 788.
27. Id. at 788 (E.D. Mo. 1988). The verdict consisted of damages in the amount
of $80,000 on Polly's claim under the Act; $2,000 under a breach of contract claim;
and $10,000 for the Tallarico's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Id
28. Id, at 790.
29. Id,
30. Id. at 790-91.
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distress were questions with ramifications that could affect the en-
tire area of antidiscrimination law and policy.
IV. The Appeal
A. Existence of a Private Cause of Action
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether the
Air Carrier Access Act created a private right to sue air carriers
for violations of the Act.31 The court turned to the seminal case of
Cort v. Ash,32 which sets forth the four-part test for determining
whether a federal statute creates an implied private cause of
action.33
The first factor in the Cort test is whether the plaintiff is
" 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted'.., that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff."34 TWA argued that Polly Tallarico was not an in-
tended beneficiary of the Act because the statute prohibited only
discrimination directed against an "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual."35 Although the statute was silent as to the
meaning of this term and TWA offered no expert testimony on this
issue, TWA argued that Polly was not an otherwise qualified hand-
icapped individual.36
31. Tallarico 11, 881 F.2d 566, 568-70 (8th Cir. 1989).
32. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cart, a stockbroker sought to bring a private cause of
action against a corporation and its directors for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970 & Supp. III 1974) (repealed 1976), which prohibited corporations from making
contributions in connection with certain federal elections. The Court held that no
such implied cause of action existed, noting that there was no indication that Con-
gress intended to create such a cause of action. The Court further noted that such
cause would not aid the primary purpose of the statute and that the area was one
traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 82-85.
33. The four factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class the
statute was intended to benefit; (2) whether there is any indication of whether Con-
gress intended to create or deny a remedy; (3) whether the implied remedy is con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the
remedy is traditionally left to state law such that giving a federal cause of action
would be inappropriate. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted).
34. IdM (quoting Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)) (em-
phasis in original).
35. Tallarico II at 569 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987)).
36. Id. The term "handicapped individual" is defined as: "any individual who
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment." 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(2) (Supp. V 1987). The Act required that the Sec-
retary of Transportation promulgate, within 120 days of the enactment of the stat-
ute (October 2, 1986), "regulations to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of
qualified handicapped individuals consistent with safe carriage of all passengers on
air carriers." Pub. L. No. 99-435, § 3, 100 Stat. 1080 (1986). As of the time of the
appeal in Tallarico, no such regulations had been promulgated. The trial court
noted that due to the lack of such regulations, TWA had "little official guidance as
[Vol. 8:469
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The Eighth Circuit disagreed with TWA's argument and
noted that the Act itself does not define the term "otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual." 37 The court went on to state, how-
ever, that Congress intended the term to be construed in
accordance with existing Department of Transportation regula-
tions.38 The existing regulations defined a "qualified handicapped
person" as a handicapped person as one:
(1) Who tenders payment for air transportation; (2) Whose car-
riage will not violate Federal Aviation Administration Regula-
tions . . . and (3) Who is willing and able to comply with
reasonable requests of airline personnel or, if not, is accompa-
nied by a responsible adult passenger who can ensure that the
requests are complied with.39
The Eighth Circuit held that Polly Tallarico met all four criteria
of the regulation.40
Of special significance to future claimants under the Act was
the court's analysis and evaluation of Polly Tallarico's ability to
comply with "reasonable safety requests of the airline person-
nel." 41 TWA attempted to justify its behavior by referring to the
many physical challenges handicapped passengers such as Polly
face and the safety concerns purportedly arising from those chal-
lenges.42 The Eighth Circuit, however, broadened the focus of its
inquiry to include evidence that demonstrated Polly's accomplish-
ments in attempting to overcome her handicap. The court noted,
for example, that Polly has normal intelligence, is able to move
about on her own, and that she had a variety of methods for com-
municating her needs and/or responding to instructions from air-
to whether particular handicaps did or did not prevent a person from being an
'otherwise qualified handicapped individual.'" Tallarico 1, 693 F. Supp. at 789.
However, the legislative history of the Act made it clear that the term was in-
tended to be consistent with the Department of Transportation's definition in 14
C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1988). See Tallarico II, 881 F.2d at 569 and infra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text. The trial court used this definition in its instructions to the
jury. See Tallarico I, at 789.
37. 881 F.2d at 569.
38. Id.; see S. Rep. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2328, 2332.
39. 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1988). There was no dispute that Polly had tendered
payment for the flight or that her carriage would not violate FAA regulations.
40. 881 F.2d at 569.
41. Id
42. TWA's position on this issue is indicative of the widespread stereotypes re-
garding the ability of disabled persons to engage in "normal" activity. For example,
the trial court stated that Polly was "wheelchair bound," despite the evidence that
she climbs in and out of her wheelchair without assistance, she can walk on her
knees, crawl, climb up and down stairs and perform numerous tasks without any
assistance whatsoever. See Tallarico I, at 789. Furthermore, Polly regularly partic-
ipates in swimming, skiing and many other physically challenging activities.
1990]
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line personnel.43 Having concluded that Polly was capable of
complying with reasonable safety requests, the court held that she
was an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual."44
This type of analysis, which considers the abilities of the indi-
vidual, rather than merely the disabilities, is clearly necessary to
carry out the spirit of the Act and to insure that the law will be
available to those individuals who are most in need of its protec-
tion. Unless airlines are willing to engage in a case-by-case evalua-
tion, individuals will too often be judged on appearances, or on the
basis of misinformation, rather than on their ability to overcome
handicaps. This type of discrimination is wholly unrelated to the
safety concerns which the air carriers insist underlie their
regulations.
Although the airline industry continues to insist that it alone
is capable of deciding whether or not a particular passenger repre-
sents a safety threat, the result is that too often airline representa-
tives fail to make an objective, individualized determination of the
issue. Instead, as in Polly's case, snap judgments are often made
without any attempt to evaluate the individual, even in the face of
airline policies to the contrary.45 Despite the conceded problems,
the airline industry is fighting to retain its unilateral power to de-
termine which individuals are fit to travel.46 An essential element
of any meaningful judicial review of an airline's decision with re-
spect to carriage of handicapped passengers must include the same
43. 881 F.2d at 569.
44. 1&
45. See infra note 84. The problem of inconsistent treatment is sometimes so
severe that a passenger will complete one part of a trip unassisted and without inci-
dent, only to be told by the same airline that an attendant is required on the return
trip. See Hunter & Layton, supra note 6, at 37-38.
46. To this end, the Air Transport Association of America recently petitioned
the Federal Aviation Administration to issue a rule establishing air carrier author-
ity to refuse service, to require a passenger to be accompanied by an attendant, and
to restrict certain seats. See FAA Summary Notice No. PR-89-4, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,388
(1989). The authority to restrict "certain seats" refers to one of the most controver-
sial issues in air travel today. The airline industry has consistently asserted that
airlines should be allowed to prohibit persons with disabilities from sitting in cer-
tain "exit row" seats. Groups representing the disabled counter that this practice is
demeaning and unrelated to any valid safety concerns. When members of bath
groups convened to try to compromise on rules to be promulgated under the
ACAA, the issue of exit row seating proved to be the sticking point which led to
the eventual breakdown of the talks. See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,574 (1988). On March 13,
1989, the FAA published a notice of proposed rule-making on this subject. 54 Fed.
Reg. 10,484 (1989) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135) (proposed Mar. 13,
1989). The proposed rule requires the airlines to determine the "suitability" of any
person it allows to sit in an exit row. Id. at 10,494 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.585). "Suitability" is supposed to be determined "in a non-discriminatory
manner consistent with the requirements of this section, by persons designated in
the [airline's] operations manual." Id. The purported purpose of the rule is to in-
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kind of balanced, individualistic evaluation the Eighth Circuit con-
ducted in Tallarico.
The appellate court then turned to the second factor in the
Cort analysis, namely whether there was any indication of legisla-
tive intent either to create a private remedy or to deny one.47 The
court first noted that, as discussed above, 48 the Air Carrier Access
Act was Congress's response to the Paralyzed Veterans case, in
which the Supreme Court had severely limited the scope of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1984.49 Additionally, the Federal Aviation
Act, which contained a general prohibition against unfair prefer-
ences, had consistently been held to create a private cause of ac-
tion.50 The court further noted that the Act was patterned after
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which implied a pri-
vate cause of action.51 The court concluded that the Congress's in-
tent was to allow individuals to sue under the Act for redress of
discriminatory airline practices.5 2 Thus, after summarily disposing
of the third and fourth factors, 53 the court concluded that an im-
plied, private cause of action does exist under the Air Carrier Ac-
sure that individuals seated in the exit row are capable of performing a number of
evacuation activities which might be required in an emergency.
While this article was being drafted, on March 6, 1990, the Department of
Transportation issued a Final Rule implementing the ACAA. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8008
(1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382) (effective Apr. 5, 1990). On the same day,
the Federal Aviation Administration issued its Final Rule regarding exit row seat-
ing. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8054 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135).
These rules do not represent a complete victory for either side of this contro-
versy. On the one hand, the Department of Transportation's rule substantially lim-
its air carriers' discretion to adopt discriminatory policies which are purportedly
safety-based. In effect, the rule prohibits any such policy which is not required by a
specific Federal Aviation Administration safety regulation. This should help to
eliminate many of the inconsistent policies previously encountered by passengers
who transfer from one airline to another or even between flights of the same air-
line. See Hunter & Layton, supra note 6, at 37. The rule also specifically limits the
situations in which an air carrier may require a passenger to travel with an attend-
ant. 55 Fed. Reg. 8029-32 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382.35).
On the other hand, the FAA rule gives air carriers discretion to prohibit handi-
capped passengers from sitting in exit row seats if the carrier determines that the
passenger is unable to perform certain objective, non-discriminatory tasks related
to exiting the aircraft. 55 Fed. Reg. 10,495-96 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 135.127).
47. Tallarico II, 881 F.2d at 569.
48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 569-70 (citing 477 U.S. 597, 605-06 (1986)).
50. Id. at 570. See Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.
1984); Smith v. Piedmont Aviation Inc., 567 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978); Nader v. Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 299
(1975) (all recognizing a private cause of action under the FAA).
51. 881 F.2d at 570. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988); see, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673
F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982).
52. 881 F.2d at 570.
53. Id.
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B. Proper Measure of Damages
Finally, the appellate court turned to the issue of the proper
measure of damages under the Air Carrier Access Act.5 5 The trial
court had decided that damages for emotional distress were not re-
coverable under the Act "because the Air Carrier Access Act is an
anti-discrimination statute, as a matter of law, emotional distress
damages are not recoverable for violations of the Act."5 6 In sup-
port of its decision, the trial court pointed to three federal antidis-
crimination statutes under which emotional damages are not
allowed:57 the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Title
VII);58 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;59 and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.6o
On appeal, the Tallaricos argued that these statutes were not
dispositive, since each contained a specific enumeration of reme-
dies available thereunder.61 Conversely, the Air Carrier Access
Act does not enumerate the remedies Congress specifically envi-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 570-71.
56. 693 F. Supp. 785, 790-91.
57. I& at 790-91 (citing Muldrew v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989, 992 n.2
(8th Cir. 1984) (no emotional distress damages in Title VII actions); Fiedler v. Indi-
anhead Truck Lines, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982) (no emotional distress
damages allowed in ADEA actions); Bradford v. Iron County C-4 School Dist., 37
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 35,404 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (no emotional distress dam-
ages in Rehabilitation Act actions); Martin v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp.,
599 F. Supp. 284, 284 (E.D. Mo. 1984)).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter Title VII].
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 and 631 (1988) [hereinafter ADEA].
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
61. 881 F.2d at 570. For instance, Title VII, the general federal prohibition on
employment discrimination, provides in part, that: "It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... ." 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) specifically provides for injunctive re-
lief, as well as reinstatement and back pay for a period of not more than two years.
Likewise, the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 and 631 (1982 & Supp. V 1985), pro-
hibits employment discrimination on the basis of age, with regard to employees be-
tween 40 and 70 years of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631. The ADEA incorporates the
remedial provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1988), which specifically provides for the recovery of unpaid minimum wages and
overtime compensation, as well as an equal, additional amount as liquidated dam-
ages. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988), incorporates the
remedies available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (1982), which provides remedies similar to those available under Title VII. See 29
U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1988); Bradford v. Iron County C-4 School Dist., 37 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) para. 35,404 at 1301-02 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
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sioned.62 Additionally, the statutes the trial court cited deal pri-
marily with employment discrimination, an area in which damages
are readily susceptible to quantification in the form of reinstate-
ment, back pay, or similar items. The damage the disability dis-
crimination in the Tallarico case caused is more difficult to
quantify.63  The adverse impact of disability discrimination
manifests itself through the victim's emotional well-being and self-
esteem more severely than on his or her pocketbook. For exam-
ple, it is relatively easy to determine the price of an airline ticket
or the cost of securing alternate transportation. Yet, the emotional
damage done to a thirteen-year-old girl, who is told that she is not
fit to travel alone and is then left to fend for herself in an airport
for over ten hours, may be less easily ascertainable, but is nonethe-
less real.64 The $1,350 the trial court awarded may have restored
the financial loss, but it fell far short of restoring Polly's self-re-
spect, dignity and peace of mind. As a deterrent, the award did
virtually nothing to dissuade airlines from the same, or worse, be-
havior in the future. In short, the trial court's ruling emasculated
the Act both as a remedial tool and as a deterrent to future
discrimination.
Furthermore, the premise underlying the district court's deci-
sion that emotional damages are unavailable, as a matter of law,
under federal antidiscrimination statutes, was erroneous. 65 As the
Tallaricos pointed out on appeal, it is well established that dam-
ages for emotional distress are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,66
which provides a remedy for individuals who are deprived of their
constitutional rights.67 Damages for emotional distress are also al-
62. It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that if a statute sets
forth a specific remedial structure, courts should be reluctant to imply any other
remedies, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary. See Bailey v. Federal In-
termediate Credit Bank, 788 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915
(1986).
63. Cf. Bradford, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 35,404, at 1302. (court dis-
cusses insufficiency of traditional employment discrimination remedies in cases of
educational discrimination).
64. The Tallaricos presented substantial evidence regarding the emotional im-
pact the incident had on Polly. 881 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1989). The Tallaricos in-
troduced evidence that Polly was visibly upset during the entire incident at the
airport. In addition, several observers noted a marked change in Polly's behavior
after the incident. Polly was angry and upset about the situation and became more
quiet and withdrawn. Id. An official at Polly's school testified that after the inci-
dent Polly spent a great amount of time alone by her bed after school, and that
Polly never regained her normal, happy disposition before the end of the school
term. Id.
65. 881 F.2d at 570.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
67. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978).
Law and Inequality
lowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1982,68 which ensures all citizens equal
rights with regard to ownership of property,6 9 and under the Fair
Housing Act,70 which prohibits discrimination in the provision of
housing.71 The Tallarico appellate court concluded that: "We be-
lieve that the purpose and operation of the ACAA are more
closely analogous to section 1983 than Title VII, the ADEA and the
Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, we conclude that emotional dis-
tress damages are allowable under the ACAA."72
Having concluded that emotional distress damages were le-
gally cognizable under the Air Carrier Access Act, the court next
discussed the burden of proof necessary to establish such damages.
Relying primarily on Missouri state law, the district court had held
that the Tallaricos failed to meet their burden of proof for dam-
ages.73 The trial court stated that, in order to prove emotional
damages, the plaintiff must introduce expert medical testimony es-
tablishing that the emotional injury was of sufficient severity as to
be medically significant.74 The appellate court found that the
lower court's standard was overly restrictive, noting that
"'[b]ecause of the difficulty of evaluating emotional injuries,
courts do not demand precise proof to support a reasonable award
of damages for such injuries.' ",'5 Rather, the court reasoned, dam-
ages for emotional distress need only be supported by competent
evidence, which may take the form of a third party's observation
of the plaintiff's behavior.7 6 The court concluded that sufficient
evidence existed to support the jury's original award to the Tallar-
icos of $80,000.77 This holding eliminates the often impossible bur-
den of proving the existence of medically diagnosable trauma in
order to recover damages for emotional distress under the Act. It
is significant that the Eighth Circuit evaluated the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof for emotional damages by referring to federal stan-
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
69. Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982); Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985). The
court in Stewart stated that "damages from constitutional torts would lie for a wide
array of intangible 'dignitary interests.'" Id. at 710 (quoting Brandon v. Allen, 719
F.2d 151, 155 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brandon v. Holt, 419
U.S. 464 (1985)).
72. 881 F.2d at 571.
73. Tallarico I, 693 F. Supp. at 791.
74. Id. (citing Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983)); State ex reL
Benz v. Blackwell, 716 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
75. 881 F.2d at 571 (quoting Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., 712 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th
Cir. 1983)).
76. 881 F.2d at 571.
77. Id.
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dards.78 The decision to apply federal law will ensure that
plaintiffs suing under the Act face a uniform burden of proof on
this issue, thus avoiding the uncertain and inconsistent results that
occur if damages depended on the law of the forum state.
V. Remaining Questions
Although the Eighth Circuit opinion in Tallarico clarifies
several major issues relating to the Air Carrier Access Act, impor-
tant questions remain unanswered. For instance, the court de-
clined to determine whether or not punitive damages are available
under the Act.
Punitive damages serve an important deterrent function, es-
pecially vital in the area of antidiscrimination statutes,79 and
should be allowed under the Act. In the past, courts have recog-
nized the importance and propriety of affording discrimination vic-
tims the right to punitive damages. For instance, under the
Federal Aviation Act,8 0 the precursor to the Air Carrier Access
Act, courts acknowledged the role of punitive damages in the dis-
crimination context. One California federal court noted that "it is
the vindication of [a plaintiff's rights] as a passenger, and the need
to protect the rights of every air passenger from future encroach-
ment, which warrants the assessment of damages over and above
the passenger's actual injury."s1
A second question left unanswered by Tallarico is, assuming
that punitive damages are recoverable under the Act, what must
the plaintiff prove in order to recover those damages? The appel-
late court upheld the trial court's decision that, as a matter of law,
the Tallaricos had presented insufficient evidence to present the
issue of punitive damages to the jury.8 2 In so holding, the court of
appeals implicitly concluded that, based on the evidence presented,
no reasonable inference could sustain a finding that TWA acted
with "'malice, gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, or
reckless disregard' for the rights of the plaintiff."8 3 This result ig-
78. Id. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978)).
79. See infra text accompanying note 81.
80. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1982). This statute provides that: "No air carrier or for-
eign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person ... or subject any particular person... to any
unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever."
81. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
82. 881 F.2d at 572.
83. 1& at 571 (quoting Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1987)
and citing Mississippi Lofts, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 251, 253 (8th Cir.
1988)).
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nores the fact that TWA did not even try to follow its own written
regulations. 84 Certainly the fact that an air carrier establishes
written procedures for treatment of handicapped travelers, and
then ignores those procedures when they become inconvenient,85
should be sufficient to allow a jury to find at least gross negli-
gence, and therefore award punitive damages.
Punitive damages should not be awarded as a matter of
course. However, air carriers must be made to realize that they
cannot ignore the rights of any passenger with impunity. Punitive
damages serve the important function of punishing the offender,
while deterring future discriminatory conduct.86 When a plaintiff
presents substantial evidence tending to establish the air carrier's
reckless or willful indifference to the passenger's rights, the issue
should be submitted to the jury in order to carry out the important
deterrent purposes of the Act. Too often, the rights, needs and
personal worth of individuals are ignored because people choose
not to look beyond a wheelchair or a cane. If appeals to human
decency and equality go unheeded, at least an appeal to the pock-
etbook, in the form of punitive damages, will force the offenders to
take notice and, like it or not, begin to treat people as individuals,
not as handicaps.
VI. Conclusion
The promise of equal access to air transportation in the Air
Carrier Access Act can never be realized unless the courts are
willing to send a strong message to the airlines that the type of dis-
criminatory treatment inflicted on Polly Tallarico and countless
other physically and mentally challenged air travelers will not be
tolerated. That message must include the real possibility that in
cases of willful or reckless disregard of the individual's rights, the
air carrier will be subject to substantial sanctions, including both
84. For instance, TWA's own Passenger and Services manual provides:
in case of any doubt as to the passenger's capability of expeditiously
moving to an exit without assistance, the passenger will be required to
demonstrate privately the capability of moving from one chair to an-
other. If he/she can do so he/she will be deemed capable of expedi-
tiously moving to an exit without assistance.
At trial it was undisputed that TWA did not even attempt to comply with this regu-
lation. The new rule, promulgated by the Department of Transportion on March 6,
1990, requires air carriers to document the steps taken to evaluate a passenger's
ability to comply with safety rules. See supra note 46.
85. There was some evidence that the TWA personnel did not go to greater
lengths to ascertain Polly's ability to travel unaccompanied because they did not
want to be bothered with such matters during the Thanksgiving Day holiday rush.
Trial Transcript Vol. 1, at 117, 168.
86. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n.9 (1986).
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damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. The Tallar-
ico decision has made great strides towards effectuating the pur-
poses of the Act. It remains to be seen whether the statute's
guarantee of equal access to air transportation will be fully
enforced.

